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The International tevelopment of India and Pakistan1
Benjamin I. Cohen
Yale University
"We recognize no legitimate demand on the student
to spare anybody's feelings.

Facts should be stated coldly:

understatements, as well as overstatements, represent biases. 11 *
*Gunnar Myrdal, Asian t'rama, p. 23.
This paper attempts to review briefly what other economists have
already written about the international trade of India and of Pakistan,
to raise some questions which may suggest further empirical work, and to
make some assertions for which I cannot now cite any reference.
I briefly discusses the import policies of India and Pakistan.

Section
Section

II examines the exports of India and Pakistan to the rest of the world,
and Section III deals with the benefits to each country of increased
trade betueen them. 2

I ignore the international movement of people and

of capital.
~aper prepared for International Economic Association Conference
on Economic Development in South Asia (Kandy p Ceylon: June 1969).
assistance was provided by Jim tubin.

Pesearch

I have benefitted from comments by

several colleagues at the Economic Growth Center.

Any errors and all

opinions are solely my responsibility.
2
.
A few readers may ,,,onder about changes in the terms of trade.

Based

on data in International Financial Statistics, India's terms of trade im
proved slightly between 1950 and 1967, as her index of export prices rose by
73 percent and her index of import prices rose by 67 percent. Using 1954-55
as a base, Pakistan's terms of trade improved by 10 percent through 1960-
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Through most of the period since 1967, both India and Pakistan have
belonged to that large group of developing countries that have included
import substitution " as an important element of their strategy of eco

1
'

nomic development .

By

11

import substitutio n" I mean the reduction in the

ratio of imports to domestic production compared to what it would have
otheXt•7ise been; this definition does not necessarily imply a reduction
in the ratio of imports to output compared to historical levels.

Indeed,

as shown in Table 1, the dollar value of imports in both India and Paki1 My
stan grew at least as rapidly as did real GNP between 1950 and 1967.
definition of import substitutio n verges, of course, on being non-opera
tional, since one cannot know with certainty what the ratio of imports
(Fobtnote 2 from previous page.)
61; using 1960-61 as a base, her terms of trade declined by 11 percent
between 1960-61 and 1966-67.

Twenty Years of Pakistan in Statistics.

(Central Statistical Office, 1968), p. 129.
1

Table 1 compares the growth in the value of imports in current

dollars with the growth of GNP in constant prices.

(Throughout this paper

growth rates are the compounded rate between the two dates mentioned.)
Adjusting the dollar value of imports for price changes would probably not
alter the conclusion : the UN index of import prices of all developing coun
tries rose by about •7 percent per year between 1950 and 1967, and the in
dex of export prices of the industrial countries rose by 1.5 percent per
year in the same period.

Internation al Financial Statistics. If one knew

the appropriate exchange rate over time, one could compare directly the
ratio of imports to GNP over time in India and Pakistan.
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Table l

Annual Percentag e Rates of Growth

1950-55
(1)

1955-60

1960-67

1950-67

(2)

(3)

(4)

1
Real GNP

3.9

4.4

3.9

4.1

Value of imports
current dollars

3.9

10.5

2.2

5.1

1.8

3.6

India

Pakistan
Real GNP

2

Value of imports
current dollars

Sources:

17.7

Gross National Product (A.I.D., July 1968).
Internati onal Financial Statistic s (various issues)

1Fiscal year beginning April 1.
2Fisca.l. year beginning July 1.

6.1.
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to production would have been under a different set of policies.

I believe,

however, that an examination of both public statements by officials and the
government's policies would support the statement that the governments of
both countries gave a fairly high priority to import substitution.
As a prelude to the rest of the paper, it may be of interest to specu
late on the reasons for the adoption of an import substitution policy in
India and Pak.istan.

2

First, such a policy may have been considered a means

towards the achievement of a faster rate of economic growth.

For example,

it might just happen that the domestic production of the commodities a
country now imports have more external economies--both static and dynamic-
than the goods it would export, and so the government would encourage the
domestic production of the country's existing import bill.

Alternatively,

following Hirschman, government officials might feel that the principal
constraint on development is the inability of potential domestic investors
to decide where to invest, with the consequence that they consume rather

1My definition also excludes any "natural" decline in the ratio of
imports to domestic production as economic growth occurs because, for ex
ample, services become a larger share of GNP.
2
While the need for revenue partially explains the use of tariffs,
it does not explain the use of licensing to achieve import substitution.
I do not think that an important objective of protection in India and
Pakistan was to protect the (unknown) scarce factor of production.
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than invest.

As imports are proof of a domestic market, an import substi

tution policy might induce people to make an investment decision--some
investment is better than no investment--and ultimately people, according
to the argument, would be willing to invest in other areas, including po
tential exports.
A second reason for pursuing an import substitution policy stems
from the belief that the country's potential exports face a dismal future
regardless of what policies the country adopts, and so the country is
forced to economize on its future use of foreign exchange as a "second
best" policy.

Like many aspects of economic policy, this belief in stag

nant exports can become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

This point is dis

cussed in more detail in Section II.
The desire for economic "independence" was probably another reason
for import substitution policies in both India and Pakistan.

Shortages

of certain commodities in world markets during the Korean War, the easy
analogy between India or Pakistan and the only developed countries of
comparable populations and land areas (USA and USSR), the danger of being
dependent on foreign suppliers in case of World War III, and the difficulty of some types of economic planning in an "open 11 economy1 all combined in India and Pakistan with the emotional desire to be independent
1 For a discussion of the implications for French economic planning
of increased French reliance on foreign markets and foreign suppliers,
see Bela Balassa, "Whither French Planning," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXIX {November 1965), pp. 537-554.
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economically as well as politically after 1947.
became an objective per~-

Thus import substitution

To the extent that the Indian and Pakistani

governments followed the principle of comparative advantage in determining
which imports to produce domestically--produce at home those commodities
for which the ratio of (eventual) domestic costs to world prices is
smallest--there was a conflict with the objective of self-sufficiency.
India and Pakistan may be more dependent now on foreign suppliers than for
merly, in the sense that their economy now relies heavily on certain "es
sential" imports, e.g., petroleum in both countries, foodgrains in India.
1
A final reason for having followed an import substitution strategy

1The economists' usual assumption notwithstanding,domes tic inputs-
natural resources and (to a large degree) labor--arenot· always very mobile
within a country, and so any government trade policy, such as "import
substitution" or "export promotion," also has implications for the
geographic distribution of employment and income.

As Baer notes, in Bra

zil, "the foreign export surplus of the northeast resulting from the in
dustrialization policy centered in the south, which has led the northeast
to buy in the south instead of abroad at less favorable terms of trade,
implies a transfer of income from the poor to the richer section of the
country."

Werner Baer,

Industrialization and Economic Development in

Brazil (Richard D. Irwin, 1965), p. 177.

The analyst's problem is whe

ther to treat this income redistribution as a cost o~ as a benefit of
the nation's foreign trade policy.

-7stems from the existence of uncertainty in the world and the asymmetrical
rewards and penalties to those officials associated with the success and
failure of policies.

Suppose a government official must choose between

two investment projects:

one to produce export commodities (and hence to

import more) and one to produce the imported commodity domestically.
pose all world prices prove to be lower than he anticipated.

Sup

The export

project will show a financial loss which (barring devaluation) will be
apparent to everyone; the import substitution project, on the other hand,
can be sustained through higher tariffs or smaller quotas, whose precise
costs are impossible to ascertain and which do not show in the govern:nent's
budget.

Similarly, if world prices are higher than anticipated, the fail

ure to have built the export project will only be apparent to those who
follow world export markets, while the failure to have built the import
substitution project will be apparent to all who are purchasing the import.
This argument is not a justification for import substitution policies,
though it may partially explain their popularity with officials.
Until recently, both India and Pakistan belonged to the gro~~ of
developing countries that promoted import substitution by means of quanti
tative controls on imports combined with an overvalued exchange rate
rather than relying solely on tariffs and subsidies.

1

It is very difficult

1For a general discussion of this phenomenon, see Charles Kindle
berger, "Liberal Policies vs. Controls in the Foreign Trade of Developing
Countries,"

AID Discussion Paper No. 14 (AID, April 1967).
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to identify when quantitative controls became significant.

India and Paki

stan have had some sort of import licensing since Independence, and I
found it impossible to trace the fluctuations over time in the complex set
. .

of pol icies. l

In the absence of time series comparing actual domestic

prices to world prices plus tariffs, one might argue that import licenses
became important in determining resource allocation in the context of a
"foreign exchange" crisis--around 1953 in Pakistan and about 1958 in India. 2

¾-or example, in May 1967 the Indian government added 80 items to
the list of goods that cannot be imported and also "virtually removed"
all restrictions on "maintenance imports" of 59 industries.
net effect of these two actions?

What is the

Exchange Restrictions, 19th Annual Re-

port (International Monetary Fund, 1968), p. 148.
2

Pakistan's exports declined from $763 million in 1951 to $533

million in 1952; imports, on the other hand, rose from $549 million in
1951 to $630 million in 1952, and total foreign exchange reserves fell
from $539 million in 1951 to $257 million in 1952 (as compared to an
annual average of $448 million from 1949 through 1950).
ports fell by 44 percent in 1953, to $350 million.

Pakistan's im

In India, foreign

exchange reserves averaged $1,870 million between 1951 and 1955 and then
fell in three years to $722 million in 1958.

After averaging $1.3 bil

lion per year in 1953-1955, India's imports rose to $1.7 billion in 1956 and
to $2.2 billion in 1957 and then fell to $1.8 billion in 1958.
are from International Financial Statistics.

Data
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Papanek gives several explanations for the Pakistan government's opting
for direct controls rather than taxes and subsidies,and this list probably ap
plies equally well to India: {i} the effects of direct controls were thought
to be more certain, (ii) civil servants were thought to be more competent than
businessmen, (iii) Pakistan had inherited an efficient system of controls from
the British, {iv) there was a greater scarcity of economic data and economic
sophistication than of administrators, (v) civil servants and some businessmen
had a self-interest in perpetuating a system of direct controls, and (vi) there
1
was an ideological reluctance to use the marketplace to allocate resources.
To this list one could add several other reasons.

There may be a conflict be

tween political cohesion and economic efficiency.

In a purely competitive

model the marketplace gives all resources to the most efficient producer, but
People who must continue living
2
together may prefer a compromise situation to a "winner take all" situation.

direct controls allow a compromise allocation.

In the real world, with

11

distortions 11 in many markets (e.g., capital market,

labor market}, it is possible that the marketplace will not allocate scarce im
ports to the most

11

efficient" firms.

The empirical question is whether an

imperfect marketplace does a better job than an imperfect bureaucracy.

Finally,

in both India and Pakistan the government (including those corporations with
the government as a major stockholder) is a large importer; many government
1

Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development Social Goals and Private

Incentives (Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 112-114.
2
This hypothesis was suggested to me by Laura Nadel;, an anthropologist ,
who developed it in trying to explain a community's choice between the use
of a court system and an administrative system for settling disputes.

-lOmanagers may dislike paying import taxes--which raise the firm's financial
costs--and prefer obtaining imports via a licensing system controlled by fellow
civil servants. 1
One can list several attributes of the Indian and Pakistani system of con
trolling imports.

The first two listed below are features of any system of im

port substitution, and the last eight are features of a licensing

system:

(1) Investment in agriculture was discouraged relative to industry, as it
was considered easier to expand domestic industrial production than domestic
agricultural productions, at least partially because at the alleged "irration
ality" of the peasants.

Agriculture was also neglected in terms of the incen
tives it received via the prices for its inputs and its output. 2 The stagna
tion in agriculture adversely affects industrial growth by driving up money
wages as food prices rise and by curtailing exports (.and hence imports of
industrial inputs).
(2) Exports were discouraged relative to production of import substitutes.
(3) While excess capability is not a logical concomitant of import licen
sing, it was in fact ubiquitous in India and Pakistan because a firm's licenses
for imports were usually linked to its "ratedn capacity, and so the firm fre
quently did not have the option of expanding output by running a second shift.
In Pakistan, the amount of single shift capacity in use (based on a survey
1

Having private imports determined by tariffs and public imports by licen

sing may be considered by private firms to be "unfair. 11

Having public firms payc

the tariff and then get reimbursed by the Ministry of Finance may not satisfy
the managers of public firms as much as getting imports duty-free.
2
For a study of this factor in Pakistan's development, see Stephen R. Lewis,
Jr., "Effects of Trade Policy on Domestic Relative Prices: Pakistan, 1951-64, 11
American Economic Review (March 1968), pp. 60-78.
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of 65 plants} was only 53 percent in the second half·; of 1963. 1 --A survey of
140 indJstries estimated that in 1964 Indian industry was running at about 82

percent of "desirable;r output.

This average figure, however, is heavily influ

enced by textiles, basic metals, and food and tobacco, which account for about

70 percent of manufacturi ng value added and were operating at over 85 percent
of 11 desirable 11 output in 1964.
at much lower levels of

11

Several other Ind-ian industries were running

desirable" output in 1963: chemicals-4 5 percent;

metal products-46 percent; electrical machinery-5 8 percent; other machinery

-63 perce~t; and transport equipment-64 percent. 2 _ The import control system
is not) of course, the sole explanation of excess capacity.

The necessity

to learn how to operate a new plant, in a period of a high rate of investment in industry, will also lead to excess capacity. 3

l

Based on an A.I.D. survey cited in paper by Walter P. Falcon and Stephen

R. Lewis, Jr. , "Economic Policy in Pakistan's Second Plan, 11 (mimeo, November

2

National Council of Applied' Economic Research, Under-Utili zation of

Industrial C~Eacity

(New

Delhi, 1965), p. 8.

1

."Desirable 'is based on

a

judgment of which industries it would be technically feasible to run two
or three shifts.···

.,

3irogan gives a formula~ for the percentage of excess capacity.

For ex•

ample, if industrial gross investment is growing at an annual rate of 10
percent, if capital lasts an a~erage of 10 years, and if the learning period
is two years, then at a point in 1time only 71 percent of installed capa-

}-.·

· city will be used.

W.P. Hogan, "Some Results in th_e Measurement of Capa-

city Utilization ," American Economic Review, Vol. 59 (March 1969) pp. 183-184.

-12(4)

Import licensing leads to large inventories investment (in addi

tion to that caused by fluctuating total imports).

While licensing gives

the government more assurance than does the marketplace in controlling the
level of total imports, individual firms have less certainty about acquiring
the amount of imports ne.cessary to achieve the most profitable output _level,
since private profitability is not given much consideration· in the--alloca
tion of licenses as practiced .in India and Pakistan.

One might argue that

corporations would .reduce inventories most by having enforceable import -con
tracts. -.;:ri.th the government, -which w·ould ·require. the.. government either to
hold large foreign exchange reserves or to stabiliz-e export earnings and
capital flows. 1
(5)

The control system .absorbs the time of a large group .of talented

people, both those in the. government who administer it and those in the
private sector .who respond to it.
(6)

Import licensing may lead to excessively capital-intensive

methods of production for those firms lucky enough to get import licenses·
(this is in addition to the capital intensity resulting. from the .pres
sures on firms to expand their plants rather than to run extra shifts).
One finds that.in India between 1957 and 1965 industrial output rose at
an annual rate of 7.9 percent and employment at an annual rate of 3.6
percent; in Pakistan between 1957 and 1964 industrial output increased
at an annual rate-of 9.9 percent and employment by 6~3 percent per year.

2

1
This hypothesis was .stimulated by Galbraith's discussion- of the
corporation vs response to uncertainty. -John Kenneth -Galbraith,.. The New
Industrial State (Houghton Miff.lin Company~ 196 7) , ch. 4.
2

Iata on employment ·in·manufacturing are from Yearbook of Labour Sta-

tistics 196 7; data on industrial ou.tput __ are -from International Financial
Statistics.
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One would expect output to grow faster than employment; 1 the as yet unanswered
question is to what extent there could have been still further substitution of
labor for capital if relative market prices had been different for labor and
capital.

As the Indian import liberalization for certain industries proceeds,

data may become available to compare their performance with other industries.
In Pakistan, which has liberalized by commodity rather than by industry, such
a comparison would seem more difficult.

To what extent is the slightly lower

annual rate of growth of productivity per industrial worker in Pakistan (3.6
percent versus 4. 3 percent) due to India's having begun its :1,mport liberaliza
tion seven years later than Pakistan?
(7)

It is difficult to establish new firms, since a potential pro

ducer has no historical output as a basis for receiving import licenses.

On

the other hand, giving a new firm an import license is a good way for the
government to insure its financial success.
(8)

Small firms may be discriminated against, since they cannot compete

with large firms in keeping full-time personnel in the capital to i-,atch and
influence the allocation of import licenses.
ports that in Pakistan

11

On the other hand, Papanek re

the established firm,especially if small and inef

ficient, was glad to be protected from competition.

Political support for

this form of protection was widespread. 11 2
(9)

Firms are encouraged to locate near the capital in order to have

access to officials.
(10) The value of imports rose at 9.8 percent per year in Pakistan
between 1953 and 1963 and at 6.8 percent per year in India between 1958
11n the USA beoqeen 1957 and 1965, employment in manufacturing rose
at an annual rate of .7 percent while production rose by 4.6 percent per
annum.

Economic Report of the President 1969 (Washington, 1969).
2Gustav F • Papanek, Pakistan's :cevelopment, Social Goals and Private
Incentives (Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 113.
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and 1965.

Even if the bureaucracy had been able efficiently to allocate

a small amount of imports, it may have become increasingly difficult for
the administrators of the import system to allocate the much larger

pool

of foreign exchange, including all the non-project foreign aid that was
offered.

At least some officials in both the donor governments and the

recipient governments had an interest in increasing, or at least maintain
ing, the flow of foreign aid and were unable to find enough large capital
projects to absorb quickly the desired flow of foreign aid.

For example,

U.S. economic aid to Pakistan averaged $121 million per year between 1953
and 1958 and $314 million per year between 1959 and 1965.

1

Some of these aspects of the import licensing system gradually be
came apparent to some government officials and private citizens in both
India and Pakistan and to some foreigners.

Papanek estimates that "mea

surable losses" from Pakistan's import control system were at least Rs.
650 million, or about 2 percent of GDP and 19 percent of "monetized in
vestment" in 1959-60.

2

Between 1959 and 1964 Pakistan gradually increased the proportion
of its imports that could be

11

freely" imported, increased the tariff and

othe~ fiscal charges on many of its imports, and introduced subsidies

1Data are for U.S. fiscal years and are from U.S. Overseas Loans
and Grants (A.I.D., 1967}.
2Gustav F. Papanek~ Pakistan's Development Social Goals and Private
Incentives {He,rvard University Press, 1967), p. 123.
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for many exports.

In 1966 India devalued the rupee, reduced some tariffs,

changed some export subsidies, and announced a policy of allowing the free
importation of raw materials and spare parts for 59 industries, whose out
put covered about 70 percent of the "organized" industrial sector.

While

one might have expected these policies to have some measurable short-run
impact, it is probably impossible to disentangle their overall effects from
1 One will
those of the Kashmir War and the bad monsoons of the mid-1960's.
never, of course, be able to answer with certainty the question of what
would have happened in India and in Pakistan in the absence of these new
import policies.

There are scattered bits of evidence that both countries

were developing very high cost industrial sectors, which was particularly

1

one can cite specific examples of the benefits of import liberaliza

tion, e.g., small engineering firms were able to import pig iron to pro
duce pumps for tubewells in West Pakistan, though other government poli
cies made the installation of tubewells privately profitable. Mason con
clucl.es "the immediate consequences of the 1964 actions on industrial out
put in Pakistan were much more the result of the increase in the level of
commodity imports than of any change in their allocation.

Given time, the

abandonment of licensing procedures would no doubt have brought market
forces more effectively into play.

As events conspired, however, the trade

liberalization measures were one of the casualties of the Inda-Pakistan
conflict."

Edwards. Mason, Economic Development in India and Pakistan

(Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1966), p. 45.

-16serious if one accepts the view1 that ultimately their exports should be
mainly industrial products.

Lewis and Guisinger 9 s study of Pakistan in

dicates that several industries--such as sugar, edible oils, silk and art
textiles, wearing apparel, electrical appliances, motor vehicles, rubber
products, fertilizer, and metal products--were p:coducing coDllllodities in

1963/64 whose value at world prices was less than the value at world
prices of their inputs.

2

Papanek, on the other hand, argues that Pakistan

became an efficient producer of jute textiles and of cotton yarn. 3 A

111 ••• India ••• or Pakistan decidedly do not have an agricultural re

source base sufficiently favorable or varied to enable them to partici
pate in the international trading comnunity over the long haul on the
basis of traditional agricultural export lines •••• Ultimately the dualis
tic economy must be able to increasingly shift from the production of
traditional natural resource-oriented agricultura,l co1mnoc1ities to the
production and export of industrial goods embodying larger quantities of
the available domestic labor resources and indigenous ingenuity."

John

C. Fei and Gustav Ranis, Development of the Labor Surplus Economy:
Theory and Polic:'[_ (Richard D. Irwin, 1964}, p. 119.
2
stephen R. Lewis, Jr., and Stephen E. Guisinger, "Measuring Pro
tection in a Developing Country:

The Case of Pakistan, 11 Journal of Poli

tical Economy (November/December 1968).

3Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Social Goals and Private
Incentives (Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 61-67.
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study by the GATT indicates that Taiwan, whose total industrial production
is much smaller than India's, exported $50 million of "engineering prod
ucts" in 1966, as compared to India's exports of $28 million. 1
In addition to high production costs, one wonders to what extent the
entrepreneurial attitudes of the country have been adversely affected by
the policy of im1ort substitution via import quotas.
Bhagwati have shown,

2

As Kindleberger and

protection behind quantitative restrictions has

different economic consequences from protection behind tariffs even when
the same amount of imports occn::cs; in particular, monopoly profits are
created.

How does the creation of monopolies affect the country's rate

of investment and ita propensity to innovate?

At the macro level, recent

studies of five Latin American countries and of the Philippines suggest
that the relative importance of the "residual 11 ---the traction of the ob
served growth of output not exple.ined by the growth of labor and of

1 International T:r8.de 1967 (Geneva:
types of

11

GATT, 1968), p. 60.

By major

enginec:cing gocds," the comparison is as follows:
Taiwan

India

$ million
industrial and agricultural
me,chinery

8

14

research-j_nterisive equipment

2

2

consumer d.u:r·a~)les

7

24

passenge1· cars and parts

2

0

heavy transport equipment

2

0

miscellaneous
9
7
total
28
49
2
Charles P. Kindleberger, International Economics (Richard D. Irwin,

1958), pp. 621-623 e,nd Jagdish Bhagwati, "On the Equivalence of Tariffs
and Quotas," Trade, Growth, a.nd the Balance of Payments (Chicago: Rand
McNally and Co., 1965), pp. 53-6'{.

-18physical capital--declined during the period of import substitution. 1
this result also true for India and for Pakistan?

Is

Even if it is, might

the decline in the importance of the residual be more than offset by a
higher rate of investment?

For example, in Brazil, Chile, and Colombia

the rate of growth of output was higheT in 1955-64 than in 1940-45 even
though the residual was relatively more important in the earlier period. 2

1

Henry Bruton, "Productivity Growth in Latin America,"

American Eco

nomic Review LVII (December 1967), pp. 1099-1116 and Jeffrey G. Williamson,
"Dimensions of Postwar Philippine Economic Progress," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, LXXXIII (February 1969), pp. 93-109.
2
The rate of growth of output and the relative importance of the
residual are positively related in Argentina, Mexico, and the Philippines.

I
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II

Perhaps the most common argument for the importance of a developing
country to expand
modities.

its exports is to pay for its growing imports of com-

In the growth models, for example, of Ricardo, Arthur Lewis,

and Fei and Ranis, the importation of cheap food allows the 1'industrial 11
(or "capitalistic") sector to continue to expand in the face of stagnant
agricultural production. 1

Economists have, of course, suggested other ef

fects of expanding exports besides paying for additional imports.

Adam

Smith observed that larger exports--as one way of expanding the market-
might increase workers' productivity by inducing innovations and by im
proving their dexterity as output rose.

Less well-known is Keynes' view

that larger exports unaccompanied by larger imports would increase foreign
exchange reserves; in a country where the supply of money is directly con
nected to the quantity of these reserves, the resulting increase in the
money supply would--by the familiar Keynesian process--lower interest
rates and thereby stimulate domestic investment. 2
1

Others have suggested

A country lacking workers may import people and use exports to

finance remitta.nces.
211 The

history of India at all times has provided an example of a

country impoverished by a preference for liquidity amounting to so strong a
passion that even an enormous and chronic influx of the precious metals has
been insufficient to bring down the rate of interest to a level which was
compatible with the growth of real wealth."

J.M. Keynes, The General Theory

of Employment, Interest and Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co.), p. 337.
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that rising exports allow a country to pay off its past foreign debt or to
acquire new foreign private debt 1 and expose the country's inhabitants to
the healthy winds of competition.

Finally, there is the group of theories

which attributes such things as rising domestic savings or shifts in domestic resources to expanding exports.

2

A few years ago M. Singh and I 3 independently concluded, by examin
ing market shares, that the stagnation of India's exports in the 1950's
was, to a large extent, due to Indian policies, and I suggested these
policies were adopted because export promotion conflicted with other Indian
objectives.

In this section I will examine brief~y the trends in the ex

ports of both India and Pakistan in the 1960 1 s.

1 To the extent that foreign aid is viewed as filling a foreign ex/

change

11

gap, 11 the flow of foreign public capital may be inversely related

to a developing country's success in promoting its exports.
2

See the discussion, for example, in Charles P. Kindleberger,

~

nomic Development (McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1958), pp. 239-259 and Richard
E. Caves, "'Vent for Surplus' Models of Trade and Growth,"
and the Balance of Payments (Rand McNally

&

Trade, Growth

Co., 1965).

3~1anmohan Singh, India's Export Trends and the Prospects for SelfSustained Growth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) and Benjamin I. Cohen,
"The Stagnation of Indian Exports, 1951-1961,"
Economics, LXXVIII (November 1964), pp. 604-620.

Quarterly Journal of
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Table 2 shows export data for 1950 through 1967.

As is well known,

the export earnings of the non-oil producing developing countries grew less
rapidly than did total world exports during this entire period. 1

It is

less well known that the export earnings of the non-•oil producing countries
\

grew considerably more rapidly in the 1960 1 s than many people anticipated
in the early 1960 1 s--at an annual rate of 5,7 percent in the 1960's versus
3.1 percent in the 1950's.

This rate of growth of exports in the 1960's

is fairly close to the 6 percent annual rate which Raul Prebisch, at UNCTAD
I, felt was necessary (if the real GNP of the developing countries were to
grow at 5 percent per annum) 2 even though none of his suggested policies
was adopted.

The actual annual rate of g:..·owth of exports of all develop

ing countries (including oil producers) in the 1960 1 s--6.1 percent 3-1 This

is true even if one excludes all intra-EEC trade and intra

EFTA trade since 1955.
well as trade

11

Excluding all such trade--trade "diverted" as

created 11 --overstates the irrpact of these two trade arrange

ments on the growth of world e:>:ports.
2Towards

A New Trade Policy for Development (New York: United

Nations, 1964), p. 4.

Between 1960 and 1967 real GNP of the developing

countries grew e.t an annue.l rate of 4. 9 percent.

Gross National Product

(A.I.D., July 1968).
3Prelimina~y data indicate
that export earnings of developing coun
tries rose by about 9 percent in 1968, bringing the annual rate of growth
from 1960 through 1968 to 6.5 percent.
Survey (March 7, 1969), p. 65.

International Financial News

Table 2
Exports

1950

195.L

1960

$million

(1)

55,200 83,000
5,647
n.a.
2,589
n.a.
74,764
n.a.

World
Intra-EEC
Intra-EFT A
Rest of world
Total less developed
countries
l

I

C\J
C\J

I

Oil producers
Other less developed
countries
India
Pakistan

Sources:

1

{2)

1967

1950- 1955- 196067
60
55

195060

1950-·
67

annual uercentag e change

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

112,300 190,500
10,246 24,513
7,018
3,491
98,563 158,969

8.5

6.3
12.6
6.1
5,7

7.8
13.3
10.5
7.1

7.3

7.6

(3)

(4)

-

17,500 22,300
3,252 5,i94

26,100
6,755

39,600
11,042

5,0
9.8

3.2
5,4

6.1
7.3

4.1
7,5

4.9
7.5

14,248 17,106
1,146 1,276
401
489

19,345
1,331
393

28,558
1,613
645

3.8
2.2
-3.8

2.5
.9
-.4

5.7
2.8
7.4

3.1
1.5
-2.2

4.2
2.0
1.6

Internati onal Financial Statistic s (April 1969 and 1965/66 Suppleme nt).
Monthly Sta;t;isti_c s Foreign Trade (Statisti cal Office of the European Communit ies).

Brunei, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Netherlan ds Antilles, Saudi Arabia, Trinidad, Venezuela .

-23made in the early
may also be compared with Balas sa's detai led proje ction s
earnin gs betwe en
1960 1 s. He proje cted an annua l rate of growt h of expor t
ries rangi ng, de
1960 and 1970 (in curre nt price s) of all devel oping count
1 His pro
nt.
pendi ng on the assum ptions , from 3.2 perce nt to 3.8 perce
billio n to
jecte d incre ase in expor ts durin g the entir e decad e of $8.5
by 1966.
$10.3 billio n over the 1960 level was actua lly achie ved
durin g
India 's expor t earnin gs grew sligh tly faste r than Pakis tan's
s 1.6 perce nt per
the entir e perio d 1950 to 1967 (2 perce nt per annum versu
g the 1950 's, in
annum). While Pakis tan's expor t earni ngs declin ed durin
non-o il pro
the 1960 1 s they grew more rapid ly than the avera ge for all
almos t twice
ducin g devel oping count ries. India 's expor t earnin gs grew
1
1960 1 s they
as rapid ly in the 1960 s as in the 1950 's, but even in the
il produ cing
grew at about one-h alf the annua l rate of the avera ge non-o

devel oping count ry.
tan's
To what exten t is the above avera ge rate of growt h of Pakis
expor ts due to
expor ts and the below -avera ge rate of growt h of India 's
to diffe rence s
differ ences in their polic ies and to what exten t is it due
1 Bela A. Balas sa, Trade Prosp ects for Devel oping Coun tries (Rich ard
D. Irwin , 1964) , p. 95.

Part of Balas sa's error may be in his overl y pessi 

the OECD coun tries;
misti c proje ction s of the rate of grovrth of real GNP in
4.1 perce nt to
while he proje cted an annua l rate of growt h rangi ng from
betwe en 1960 and
4.7 perce nt, the actua l annua l rate of growt h of real GNP
1967 was 5 perce nt.

Ibid, pp. 34, 35, 44.
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in the composition of their exports?

As a proxy for world demand, I have

used the value of imports by the European OECD countries,

1 by the U.S. and

Canada, and by Japan, which in 1965 purcha.sed 55 percent of India's total
exports and 46 percent of Pakistan's total exports.

Table 3 compares Euro

pean OECD imports from India and Pakistan with total imports for each of
14 commodities; Table 4 gives a similar comparison for the U.S. and Canada,
and Table 5 presents Japanese data.

In 1965 these 14 commodities accounted

for 71 percent of India's total exports and for 84 percent of Pakistan's
total export earnings.
European imports of these commodities from India declined in the 1960 1 s.
For the 13 commodities which Europe imported from India in 1967, India's
share of total imports declined between 1960 and 1967 for all except to
bacco, raw cotton, raw jute, and sugar.

If India had maintained her 1960

share of European imports of each of these 13 commodities in 1967, Europe's
imports of these commodities from India would have been $560 million in
1967 rather than the actual $372 million.
In two respects) Pakistan's perfornancc in Europe seems quite dif
ferent.

Europe's imports of these commodities from Pakistan increased very

slightly in the 1960 1 s.

Of the 11 commodities which Europe imported from

Pakistan in either 1960 or 1967, Pakistan's share of total imports rose
between 1960 and 1967 for all commodities except tea, oilcakes, raw jute,
and cotton yarn.

However, the poor performance for raw jute--where her

share of imports fell from 93 percent in 1960 to 79 percent in 1967--and
oilcakes--where her share of imports fell from 10 percent in 1961 to
1

Excluding Finland.

-25Table 3
European 0ECD Imports from India and Pakistan

1960

1967

$million, cif

Commodity (SITC No.)
Cotton textiles {652.1 + 652,2)
Total
India
Pakistan

Annual Percentage
Rate of Growth

1960-1967
(3)

(1)

(2)

652
75
12

510
29
12

-3.4
-12.7
0

297
42
9

458
48
17

6.4
2,0
9,5

381
199
4

359
160
0

-3.1

88
16
0

88
5
0

0
-15,8
0

117
4
1

137
5
1

2,3
3,2
0

213
52
2

317
42
19

5,8
-3.0
38

831
42

811
6
0

- .3
-24

Jute products (653.4 + 656,1 +

657,5 + 657,6)
Total
India
Pakistan
Tea

(074)

Total
India
Pakistan
Manganese ore (283,7)
Total
India
Pakistan
Cotton yarn

{651.3

Total
India
Pakistan
Leather

Total
India
Pakistan

651.4)

(611)

Total
India
Pakistan
Iron ore

+

- ,9

(281.3)

0

0

-26Table 3 (continued)

1960

1967

Annual Percentage
Rate of Growth

$million, cif
Commodity (SITC No.)

1960-1967
(3)

(1)

(2)

444

554
8
2

3.2

55
4
0

3,5
0
0

34411
32
341

687
24
6

12.2
-4.7
-2.5

614
28
0

771
36
1

3.3
3.7

1,088
3
6

890
4
9

-2.8
4.2
6.o

65
0
0

100

6.3
0

121
1
114

154
1
122

3-5
0
1.0

5,298
498
182

5,891
372
190

1.6
-4.o
.6

568
175

532
222

- .9
3.4

(061)

Sus;ar
Total
India
Pakistan

0

0

SJ2ices
Total
India
Pakistan

(075)

Oil cakes

(081.3)

43
4
0

Total
India
Pakistan

(121)

Tobacco
Total
India
Pakistan
Raw Cotton

(263)

Total
India
Pakistan

(042)

Rice
Total
India
Pakistan

0

1

(264)

Raw jute
Total
India
Pakistan

Total above commodities
Total
India
Pakistan
Tot al imEorts
India
Pakistan
Sources:

11961.

Various issues of Trade by Commodities (OECD).

-27Table 4
United States and Canada Imports from India and Pakistan

1960

1967

$million, fob

Annual Percentage
Rate of Growth

(1)

(2)

1960-1967
(3)

229
18
4

210
13
6

-1.3
-4.6
6.o

248
100
7

266
174
28

LO
8.3
22

81
23
0

Bo
15
0

- .2
-5-9
0

85
14
0

61
4
0

-4.7
-16.4
0

17
0
0

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

51
1
0

87
3
1

7.9
17.0

Total
India
Pakistan

322
0
0

475

5.7

Su6ar
Total
India
Pakistan

610
0

693
12

0

0

Commodity
Cotton textiles
Total
India
Pakistan
Jute :12roducts
Total
India
Pakistan
Tea
Total
India
Pakistan
Manganese ore
Total
India
Pakistan
Cotton yarn
Total
India
Pakistan
Leather
Total
India
Pakistan
Iron ore

0

0

0

0
1.8
0
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Table 4 (continued)
1960

1967

$million, fob
Commodity

(1)

(2)

Annual Percentage
Rate of Growth
1960-1967
(3)

Spices
Total
India
Pakistan

53

50

11
0

3
0

-LO
-17.0
0

1
17
01
01

24
0
0

5.1
0
0

120
0
0

168
0
0

5.0
0
0

90
2
2

97
2
1

1.1
0
-9.4

9

10
0
0

1.6
0
0

9

10
0
8

1.6
0
-1.7

1,941
169
22

2,231
226
44

2.0
4.2
10.4

260
37

337

3.8

59

6.9

Oilcakes
Total
India
Pakistan
Tobacco
Total
India
Pakistan
Raw cotton
Total
India
Pakistan
Rice
Total
India
Pakistan

0
0

Raw Jute
Total
India
Pakistan

9
0

Total above commodities
Total
India
Pakistan
Total im12orts
India
Pakistan
Sources:
1

1961.

Same as Table 3,

-29Table 5
Japanese Imports from India and Pakistan

Commodity

1960
1967
$millio n,cif
(l)
(2)

Annual Percenta ge
Rate of Growth
1960-1967
(3)

Cotton textiles
Total
India
Pakistan

l

0
0

7
0
0

32
0
0

Total
India
Pakistan

2
l
0

5
l
0

14
0
0

Total
India
Pakistan

2
0
0

7
0
0

19.6
0
0

78
42
0

38
9
0

- 9.7
-20
0

0
0
0

8
0
7

0

3
2
0

9
4
2

18.8
10.4

213
67

19.0
10.2

0

718
132
0

121
0
0

177
l
l

5.6

~e product s

Tea

Mans;anese ore
Total
India
Pakistan
Cotton yarn
Total
India
Pakistan
Leather
Total
India
Pakistan
Iron ore
Total
India
Pakistan

0

Sus;ar

Total
India
Pakistan

-30Table 5 (continued)
1960
1967
$million,cif
(1)
(2)

Commodity

Annual Percentage
Rate of Growth
1960-1967
(3)

Spices
Total
India
Pakistan

3

4

4.2

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0
0

7
0

0
0

14

57

22

0
0

3
0

420

443

13

18

17

11

-6.o

20

82

22

0
0

0
0

0
0

12

21

0

0

10

7

-4.9

Oilcakes
Total
India
Pakistan

3

Tobacco
Total
India
Pakistan

0

Raw cotton
Total
India
Pakistan

.8

4.8

Rice
Total
India
Pakistan
Raw jute
Total
India
Pakistan

8.3
0

Total above commodities
Total
India
Pakistan

889

1,583

125
27

171

8.6
4.6

28

.5

126

259

10.8

32

38

2.5

Total imports
India
Pakistan
Sources:

1960 Annual Return of Foreign Trade of Japan
Trade by Commodities (OECD).
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1 percent in 1967--more than offset the improved performance in the other
7 comm.odities.

If Pakistan had maintained her 1960 share of European

imports of each of these 11 commodities in 1967, Europe's imports of these
commodities from Pakistan in 1967 would have been $249 million rather than
the actual $190 million.
The record is somewhat more optimistic for imports by the United States
and Canada.

For these 14 commodities, imports from both India and Pakistan

grew more rapidly than total imports. For the 9 commodities imported from
India in 1967, India's share of total imports declined between 1960 and
1967 for all except jute products, leather, and sugar.

If India had main

tained her 1960 share of U.S. and Canadian imports for each of these 9
commodities, 1967 imports of these commodities from India would, however,
have been $173 million rather than the actual $226 million.

India's rising

share of imports of jute goods and sugar more than compensated for declines
in the other commodities.
For the 5 commodities imported by the United States and Canada from
Pakistan in 1967, Pakistan's share increased between 1960 and 1967 for all
except raw cotton and raw jute.

If Pakistan had maintained her 1960 share

of U.S. and Canadian imports for each of these 5 commodities, 1967 imports
from Pakistan would have been $44 million rather than the actual $23 mil
lion.
As in Europe, Japan's total imports of the 14 commodities rose more
rapidly than her imports from either India or Pakistan in the 1960 1 s.

Of

the 8 commodities actually imported from India, India's share of Japanese

-32-

imports fell for jute products, manganese ore, leather, and iron ore. 1

Of

the five commodities actually imported from Pakistan, Pakistan's share of
total Japanese imports declined for raw cotton and raw jute.

l1aintenance

of the actual 1960 share of Japanese imports for each commodity would have
meant imports from India of $270 million--compared to an actual $171 mil
lion--and imports from Pakistan of $37 million--compared to an actual $28
million.
The faster growth of actual export earnings by Pakistan is due to
some extent to a more favorable composition of exports.

As shown in Table

6,projected 1967 OECD purchases of these 14 commodities from Pakistan are
34 percent above actual 1960 purchases, as compared to projected 1967 OECD
purchases from India being 27 percent above actual 1960 purchases.
Table 6 reveals that for neither India nor Pakistan did the im
proved competitive position in the United States and Canadian market off
set the decline in Western Europe and Japan.

Declining market shares

are the general rule for India, 2 and rising market shares--usually from
a smaller absolute base--are the general rule for Pakistan in the 1960's,
which suggests that Pakistan's export subsidies were more substantial
than India's.

For example, India's share of European imports of cotton

textiles fell from 12 percent in 1960 to 6 percent in 1967 and her share
1
All 1960 data include imports from Portuguese India.
2
The impact of the Indian devaluation of 1966 is mixed.

Comparing

India's share of imports in 1965 and 1967, one finds her share declined in
all three markets for manganese ore, iron ore, and cotton textiles; her share
rose in all three markets for tobacco.

For the other commodities her share

rose in some markets, declined in others, and occasionally

lJaS

unchanged.
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Table 6

Imports of Selected Commodities

1960
Western Euro:ee, cif

Actual

1967
Actual

2

Projected

Annual Percentage Rate
of Growth, 1960-67
Actual
Projected2

$ Million

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

4981
1821

372

560

-4.o

1.7

190

249

.6

4.5

1691
221

226

173

4.2

.3

44

23

10.4

.6

125

171

270

4.6

11.6

27

28

37

.5

4.6

India

792

769

1,003

- .3

3.4

Pakistan

231

262

309

1.8

4.2

India
Pakistan
United States and
Canada 2 fob
India
Pakistan
Ja:12an, cif
India
Pakistan
Total above

11961 data for oilcakes.
2Assuming 1960 share of actual 1967 total imports of each commodity.
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of leather imports fell from 25 percent to 13 percent, in the same period
Pakistan' s share of cotton textile imports remained at 2 percent and her
share of leather imports rose from 1 percent to 6 percent.

If India and

Pakistan had each maintaine d her 1960 share of each commodity in each
major market, purchases by the OECD countries of these commoditi es would
have been 30 percent larger than the actual $769 million from India and
18 percent larger than the actual $262 million from Pakistan.

-35-

III

The preceding discussion suggests that the similarities between India's
foreign trade and that of Pa.kistan--in terms of both policies and perfor
1
mance--exceed the differences--both currently and over the last 20 years.
Both countries still rely to a large extent on import licensing; neither can
be confidently said to have produced an export sector which can generate
enough foreign exchange to meet the government's announced economic aspira
tions of the next decade.

2

Both prefer a policy of a collection of export

subsidies to a policy of a large devaluation combined with, perhaps,selective
export taxes. 3
1

Neither country attracts much foreign private investment,

4

one can think of other pairs of neighboring developing countries for

which this statement would not be true, e.g., Colombia and Peru in the 1960 1 s.
2
This statement assumes a continuation of the present level of gross
foreign aid, and so a decline in net foreign aid as repayments on past aid
increase.
3While some feel that the Indian devaluation of 1966 was designed to

allow the elimination of ad hoc export subsidies, it seems that many such
subsidies remain.

4In 1967 new U.S. private investment (including reinvested earnings)
amounted to $23 million in India.

Published data on Pakistan are unavail

able, but U.S. investment in all of the Far East excluding India, Japan,
and Philippines was only $120 million in 1967.
(October 1968), p. 24.

Survey of Current Business

-36and neither has large foreign exchange reserves . 1
If it is accepted that the relation s of India and of Pakistan with the
rest of the world have a great deal in common, then one might wonder about

the economic benefits and costs of a customs union between the two nations
(which, for stylisti c convenie nce, I shall refer to as South Asia).

It may

be appropr iate to discuss the definiti on of a customs union in the South
Asian environm ent.

Economists tend to assume that in the absence of a cus

toms union each country grants "most favored nation" treatme nt with its
tariffs to all countrie s and that tariffs are the sole means of regulati ng
the composi tion of imports.

These assumpt ions are unreali stic for India

and Pakista n, where licensin g seems more importan t than tariffs in deter
mining the composi tion of trade flows and where neither India nor Pakistan
now grants its neighbo r "most favored nation" status in the allocati on of
import licenses .

The distinct ion between a free trade area (each country

having its own set of externa l tariffs) and a customs union {each country
having the same set of externa l tariffs) is rather fuzzy when licensin g
dominat es, since the essence of licensin g is adminis trative discreti on.
One could have a common licensin g system only if one had a single licen
sing agency for both countrie s.

A working definiti on of a "customs union"

between India and Pakistan for the rest of this paper is that commodities
flow as easily between the two countrie s as within each country .

This

1Foreign
exchange reserves (gold, foreign exchang e, and IMF reserves )
at the end of 1967 as a fraction of 1967 imports were 24 percent for India
and 15 percent for Pakistan .
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definition is not stated in terms of free trade between the two countries,
as there does not now exist free trade within each country; would India,
for example, allow free trade in foodgrains with Pakistan when free trade
of foodgrains is not now permitted within India.
The large economics literature on customs unions tends to stress two
static benefits to the member nations:

(i) trade creation on the basis of

production along comparative advantage between the countries to replace
each country's producing domestically everything that is not imported from
the rest of the world and (ii) economies of scale which are attained by
exporting to each other but which are unattainable through exports to the
rest of the world, presumably because transport costs and/or foreign tar
iffs are too high or because member countries' currencies are overvalued.
One might also argue that over time the countries will attract more foreign
private investment as a customs union than as economically separate nations.
I will also discuss three other possible benefits:

reduction 1n transport

costs, favorable effects on the terms of trade, and reduction in military
expenditures.
Trade diversion stemming from the customs union might injure certain
industries in foreign countries, e.g., Pakistan's importing steel from
India rather than from the rest of the world.

A cost to the governments

participating in the customs union is their reduced ability to use the
effective exchange rate (nominal exchange rate and taxes and subsidies on
foreign trade) as an instrument to achieve their numerous economic objec
tives.

Against this loss must be set the possible gain to each participant

of more easily achieving its economic objectives through better coordination

-38of the policies of the two countries. 1
In the case of India and Pakistan, a reduction in transport costs would
be a benefit from a customs union that is frequently overlooked ~n the theo
retical literature.

2

The ability of East Pakistan to import manufactured

goods from eastern India and of western India to import from West Pakistan
would release resources that are now used in transportation within Pakistan
and within India.

One can only guess as to the quantitative importance of

these freight costs.

aose estimates that in 1961/62 freight charges between

Eaat Pakistan and West Pakistan amounted to about Rs. 37 million. 3 I was
unable to find estimates of freight costs in eastern India and in western
India.

As ec.onomic growth proceeds, freight costs will s:urely rise

1This paragraph, and this entire section of the paper, owe much to
Jeffrey Nugent's unpublished study of the Central .American Common Market.
2Lipsey's admirable article, for example, does not mention this bene
fit.

R.G. Lips~y, "The Theory of Customs Unions: A General Survey,"

EconoMic Journal (September 1960) reprinted in Caves and Johnson, eds.,
Readings in International Economics (Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968).

3Bose estimates major changes between East Pakistan and West Pakistan
at Rs. 50 per ton; in 1961/62 West Pakistan imported 128,000 tons from
Ea,st Pakistan and exported 644,000 tons to East Pakistan.

Swadesh Ranjan

Bose, Regional Cooperation for Development in South Asia with Special
Reference to India and Pakistan (Ph.D. dissertation submitted to Uni
versity of Cambridge, January 1967), pp. 110, 115.

-39absolutely and, for some time, probably also rise as a proportion of GNP. 1
Much of the literature on a customs union also tends to assume that
it will have no effect on the terms of trade.

In the case of India and

Pakistan, however, cooperation in the jute industry might allow the two
countries to increase their combined export earnings for two reasons.
First, acting as a monopolist rather than as aggressive duopolists would
permit larger earnings.

Second, cooperation in stabilizing the price of

raw jute (and hence of jute products) through some sort of buffer stock
might well raise the average level of export sales. 2

1Wilfred
Owen, Strategy for Mobility (Washington, D.C., The Brook
ings Institution, 1964), pp. 44-51.
2

The following table shows the percentage change in prices of raw

jute and of burlap in recent years:
Year

Raw Jute

Burla:e_

1962
1963

-30

-4

- 5

4

1964
1965

3

-5

17

12

1966

4

8

1967

5

-7

Source:

International Financial Statistics, (April 1969).
MacBean reviews the evidence on the significance of fluctuating prices and
on the elasticities of supply and demand of raw jute.

While discussing

policies Pakistan might adopt, he does not consider joint policies.

A.I.

MacBean, "Problems of Stabilization Policy in Underdeveloped Countries {Il
lustrated from a Study of Jute in Pakistan), "Oxford Economic Papers,
14 (October 1962), pp. 251-266.

Vol.
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As for the benefit of trade creation, one wonders whether anyone can
predict, even roughly, the size of the gains to the combined national out
put of India and Pakistan by letting each produce according to comparati ve
advantage .

In theory, one might look at the pattern of productio n and trade

around 1947, l but much investmen t and the introduct ion of new technolog y
reduce the probabili ty that the optimum pattern of productio n and trade in
the 1940's would be near the optimum pattern of 1970.

There are a few

"obvious" examples, e.g., let East Pakistan grow all of South Asia's raw
Jute and let India substitut e rice for its present raw jute productio n.
What, however, is the quantitat ive significa nce of these particula r real
locations ?

While using various methods, the quantitat ive estimates made

of the economic gains of other customs unions are uniformly small--le ss
than l percent of national income. 2
1In

1948/49, India accounted for 80 percent of East Pakistan 's for

eign trade and 53 percent of Wes·t Pakistan' s foreign trade.

M. Akhlaqur

Rahman, Partition , Integrati on, Economic Growth and Interregi onal Trade
(Karachi:

The Institute of Development Economic s, 1963), p. 88.

Rahman

notes (p. 101) that "reliable data relating to the prepartit ion interregi onal
flow of goods and services in undivided India are not available .
2

Bela Balassa, ilTrade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European

Common Market, 11 Economic Journal (March 1967) , pp. 1-21; Edwin .M. Truman,
"The European Economic Community: Trade Creation and Trade Diversion ,"
(Ph.D. dissertat ion submitted to Yale Universit y, 1967); Harry Johnson, "The
Gains from Freer Trade with Europe," .Manchester School {September 1958) ;
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It may be easier to guess the economic benefits of economies of scale
accruing to specific industri es within a South.A sian customs union.

From

the observed experien ce of other countri es, one can measure the reductio n
in costs if one assumes South Asian cost curves would be the same as those
of other countrie s, and I presume the governm ents of both countrie s have
made many such estimate s.

It is not necessa rily correct that Pakistan will

benefit more from a customs union than India simply because Pakista n's popu
lation (and GNP) are about 1/4 that of India.

As Adam Smith taught us, the

economic size of the market is heavily influenc ed by transpo rt costs.

For

example , the farthest point of East Pakistan is about 300 miles away from
Calcutta .

One can guess that about 121 million Indians now live within
300 miles of Calcutta . 1 Thus, assuming transpo rt costs proporti onal to dis
tance, Calcutt a's economic market would signific antly increase if trade with
70 million East Pakistan is became as easy as trade within India.

Similar

calcula tions could be done for the industr ial areas of northwe st India.
Footnot e 2 continue d from previous page.
Tibor Scitovsk y, Economic Theory and Western European Integrat ion (Stanfor d
Univers ity Press~ 1958); J. Wemelsf elder,

11

The Short-Te rm Effect of the

Lowering of Import Duties in Germany, 11 Economic Journal (March 1960).
1

The 1961 census reveals that 102 million Indians lived in dis

tricts within a 300 mile radius of Calcutta .
of populat ion growth of 2. 5 percent .

I assume an annual rate

-42Besid es comm oditie s for which demand is a funct ion of the
number of peopl e at
vario us level s of per capit a incom e, there are comm oditie
s for which demand is
more a funct ion of some aggre gate, such as total inves tment
or total agric ultur al
produ ction. For examp le, steel used for priva te autom obiles
depen ds on the
number of peopl e with high incom es, but steel used for const
ructio n depen ds on
the size and comp ositio n of inves tment . What would be the
reduc tion in costs
for such items as ·steel and ferti lizer if East Pakis tan
and easte rn India could
use the same produ ction facil ity? Papan ek concl udes that 11
for most of Pakis tan's
indus try ••. inade quate plant size was not the proble m. Firms
in such indus tries
as cotto n texti les, jute, cemen t, and simpl e metal -work ing
could reach the
optimum scale withi n the Pakis tan marke t. This proble m
may be more relev ant
for futur e develo pment ; some petro chem ical proce sses, for
insta nce, invol ve
subst antia l economies of scale , and optim um-si zed plant s
may be too large
111
for dome stic demand.
For India , natio nal marke ts may appea r large
enough to captu re all econo mies of scale provi ded one abstr
acts from trans 
port costs . Allow ing for trans port costs , howev er, may
mean that for some
coirenodities easte rn India and north west India might be suppl
ied more cheap ly
from a regio nal pildmt if it could also sell to Pakis tan.
Furth ermor e, even
if the prese nt natio nal marke t in eithe r Pakis tan or India
is large enough to
allow one firm to captu re all economies of scale , one may
desir e many firms
in each indus try to captu re also the benef its of comp etitio
n.
1

Gusta v F. Papan ek, Pakis tan's Devel opmen t, Socia l Goals
and Priva te

Incen tives (Harv ard Unive rsity Press , 1967) , p. 107,
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Perhaps the major benefit to each country of analyzing the benefits
of a customs union would be hhe reduction in military expenditure s, which
amount to about 3 percent of GNP in both India and Pakistan. 1
might occur in one of two ways.

This reduction

If the economic benefits of a customs union

are judged to be small, then one might argue that the economic benefits of
either country's conquering the other would also be small. 2

If this argument

is accepted by both governments , then one might conclude that military
expenditure s could be substantial ly reduced. 3

If the benefits of a customs

union are judged to be large, then the steps to build the mutual trust to
form the union would also affect military spending.

A reduction in military

expenditure s could, of course, logically occur in the absence of a customs
union.and may well be a political prerequisit e.

1

In 1967-68 India's defense budget was about $1.1 billion and Pakistan's

about $436 million.

New York Times (May 26, 1967 and June 11, 1967).

In Latin America military expenditure s average

about 1 percent of GNP.

2
This assumes that the economic benefits of a common market are the
same for South Asia as for a customs union.

3This argument assumes that
each country determines its military ex
penditures in terms of what the other is spending rather than by what third
countries are spending.

Even if third country expenditure s are relevant,

it is conceivable that there would be economies if India and Pakistan had
a joint defense against third countries and no need~ defense against
each other.
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Finally, what can one say about the optimum sequence of measures to
achieve the objective of a customs union?

One can list several projects

which might well benefit both India and Pakistan, and some of these--such
as allocation of water in east India and East Pakistan, a buffer stock for
raw jute--have no logical connection with the creation of a customs union,
except as they help to build mutual trust.

Other steps--such as a pay

ments arrangement or the aid donorsv allouing tied aid funds to each coun
try to be spent in the other country-- could be related to a customs union.
Economists tend to assume that all relevant functions are known with per
fect certainty and then preceed to develop

11

marginaln decision rules for

dealing with small changes in the parameters.

l'ecision-makers, on the

other hand, tend to start with the observation that the future environment
is highly uncertain, that present actions tend to have unforeseen conse
quences, and that social experiments are frequently irreversible.

This

view of the world also leads to marginal decisions, an assessment of their
consequences, and then to further small changes.

The attempts to bring

about customs unions in Europe, Central America, and Latin America have
all proceeded by small steps, but each followed a different sequence.

If

one wants a customs union, one might conclude that almost any first step
is better than no motion due to inability to agree on the best first step.

